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1. Introduction 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has ruled that the 2006 Data 
Retention Directive
1
 is invalid.
2
 The basis of invalidity was the exceeding of the limits 
imposed by the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). The decision was in respect of two 
joined preliminary references, one from Ireland and the other from Austria. 
The decision is a significant step in the development of the ECJ’s jurisprudence with 
regard to the protection of fundamental rights. This is the first time that the ECJ has 
declared not just individual provisions but an entire legal instrument invalid for 
violations of Charter rights. Despite suggestions from the Advocate General that the 
legislature be given an opportunity to amend the law, the invalidity is absolute and 
immediate. A closer inspection of the court’s reasoning also provides fresh insights 
into the court’s interpretation of the right to privacy (Article 7, Charter) and the 
relatively new right to data protection (Article 8, Charter), and scope for further 
development on the relationship between surveillance and freedom of expression 
(Article 11, Charter). 
In this short note, we will consider significant aspects of the decision, and discuss the 
ways in which it may have an impact on the specific issue of data retention and on 
wider questions of fundamental rights in the European Union. 
2. Context 
2.1 The Directive 
The Directive provided that member states must adopt laws requiring communications 
service providers (CSPs) to retain certain types of traffic, subscriber and location data 
generated by users of their service (Article 6). The retention period is between six and 
twenty-four months, although member states may opt for longer periods where they 
face "particular circumstances warranting an extension for a limited period" (Article 
12(1)).  
Some aspects of data retention are left to the member states. The retained data is to be 
available for the purposes of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious 
crime, although there is no definition of "serious crime" in the Directive. As such, 
member states will adopt their own threshold for when data can be used. Neither does 
the Directive regulate the conditions for access by public authorities and law 
enforcement authorities of the member states. 
                                               
1 Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision 
of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC. 
2 Cases C-293/12 (Digital Rights Ireland) and C-594/12 (Kärntner Landesregierung). 
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2.2 Procedural history 
This case was not the first review of the Directive by the ECJ. The Irish Government 
had unsuccessfully challenged the legal basis, in a case determined by the ECJ in 
2009.
3
 The result on that occasion was that the Directive was held to have been 
appropriately made on the basis of article 95 (now article 114 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) as an internal market measure. 
Fundamental rights were not considered in the 2009 decision.  
The same government then found itself the subject of further proceedings in Ireland. 
Campaign group Digital Rights Ireland brought an application for judicial review of 
the Directive before the High Court of Ireland. The court made a preliminary 
reference to the ECJ, setting out questions on the compatibility of the Directive with 
Article 5(4) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (necessity and proportionality), 
and with a range of rights protected by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In 
2012, an action was brought before the Austrian Constitutional Court by the state 
government of Carinthia and over 11,000 individual applicants. The applicants 
claimed that the Austrian law transposing the Directive infringed their rights under 
Article 8 of the Charter. Again, a preliminary reference was made. The ECJ joined the 
two cases together in 2013. 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón gave his Opinion in December 2013, in which he 
concluded that the Data Retention Directive is, as a whole, incompatible with Article 
52(1) of the Charter, since the limitations on the exercise of fundamental rights it 
contains are not accompanied by the necessary principles for governing the 
guarantees needed to regulate access to the data and their use. He recommended that 
the ECJ find that the Directive is invalid, but that the effects of that finding should be 
suspended pending adoption by the EU of the measures necessary to remedy the 
invalidity. 
3. Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
The court treated the various questions of the referring courts as a request to examine 
the validity of the Data Retention Directive in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 11 of the 
Charter. It found that all three rights were capable of being engaged. 
3.1 Which rights are engaged? 
It found that the retention of communications data pursuant to Articles 3 to 5 of the 
Directive, for the purpose of possible access to them by the competent national 
authorities, directly and specifically affects private life. It based its conclusion on the 
fact that communications data "as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions to be 
drawn concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained, such 
as the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or 
other movements, the activities carried out and the social environments frequented by 
them".
4
 As a result, it found that the Directive fell within the scope of Article 7 of the 
Charter. The data retention requirement imposed by Articles 3 and 6 of the Data 
                                               
3 Ireland v European Parliament, [2009] ECR I-593. 
4 Digital Rights Ireland, note 2 above, at [27]. 
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Retention Directive constitutes in itself an interference with the rights guaranteed by 
Article 7 of the Charter. As the Advocate General already pointed out in his opinion, 
such a retention requirement derogates from the system of protection of the right to 
privacy established by the Data Protection Directive
5
 and the E-Privacy Directive.
6
 In 
addition, the access of the competent national authorities to the retained data 
constitutes a further interference with that fundamental right.  
In finding that the Directive was within the scope of article 7, the court drew upon its 
own case law, including Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert
7
 and Österreichischer 
Rundfunk,
8
 and that of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular S. and 
Marper v the United Kingdom.
9
 The court made it clear that both the retention of and 
access to personal data (in this case communications data) constitutes an interference 
with the right to privacy. This is important as proponents of data retention have long 
argued that the mere retention of data should be regarded as a lesser type of 
interference and should therefore not enjoy the full protection provided for by Article 
7. However, the ECJ follows the ECtHR in emphasising the engagement of 
fundamental rights, and found that “[t]he retention of data for the purpose of possible 
access to them by the competent national authorities […] directly and specifically 
affects private life”.10 
The court also made it clear that the mere retention of communications data 
constitutes the processing of personal data within the meaning of Article 8 of the 
Charter and, therefore, necessarily has to satisfy the data protection requirements 
arising out of that Article. This assessment differs from the Advocate General's view, 
who had argued that the Article 7 right applied to the collection and retention of data, 
while the Article 8 right covered its subsequent use. Since the Directive was not 
concerned with the latter, the Advocate General did not think that Article 8 needed to 
be examined. Although the court’s reliance on article 8 has not added much to its own 
interpretation of that relatively new right (many EU legal scholars would have 
preferred a more precise delineation between the scope of Article 7 and Article 8), it 
can fairly be said that, in general, the retention of personal data constitutes an act of 
processing and that Article 8 is therefore engaged – a finding of relevance across the 
European data protection system. 
The ECJ furthermore acknowledged the potential impact data retention could have on 
individuals' exercise of the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 11 of the 
Charter. Although the court ultimately did not see a need to examine the validity of 
the Directive in the light of Article 11, it found that it was not inconceivable that the 
retention of the data in question might have an effect on Internet users' use of means 
of electronic communication. At a time when certain, important cases are perceived as 
                                               
5
 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data. 
6 Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector. 
7
 [2010] ECR I-11063. 
8 [2003] ECR I-4989. 
9 (2009) 48 EHRR 50. 
10 Digital Rights Ireland, note 2 above, at [29]. 
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turning on a conflict between the ECHR/Charter articles on expression and on 
privacy, even the recognition that a law on data presents an arguable challenge to the 
vindication of the right to freedom of expression is important. The court draws upon 
the established formulation of “chilling effects” as threats to the freedom of 
expression, providing opportunities to future litigants to formulate Charter claims in a 
range of different fashions. 
3.2 Was there interference, and was that interference in pursuit of a legitimate 
objective? 
Having established the relevance and engagement of the rights, the court went on to 
hold that the interference with the rights in Articles 7 and 8 was not justified. Initially, 
though, the court declined to find that the essence of either right was adversely 
affected. Its basis for this finding was the non-application of the Directive to the 
content of electronic communications (in respect of article 7) and requirements for 
data protection and data security (in respect of article 8).  
However, the court made it clear that it considered the Directive to constitute a 
particularly serious interference with those rights, highlighting in particular "the 
important role played by the protection of personal data in the light of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life"
11
, and the likely impact on individuals' 
perception of surveillance. In a particularly evocative formulation, the court explained 
the issue as follows: "the fact that data are retained and subsequently used without the 
subscriber or registered user being informed is likely to generate in the minds of the 
persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant 
surveillance". This particular finding strongly echoes observations made by the 
German Constitutional Court in its 1984 “Census” decision, where it had stressed the 
importance of a right to informational self-determination as a facilitator for the 
exercise of other fundamental rights.
12
 In particular, the Constitutional Court had 
argued that an individual, who was unsure if information about differing behaviour is 
at all times noted, permanently stored, used or disclosed as information, will try not to 
attract attention through such behaviour.  
On the other hand, this interference was in pursuit of an objective of general interest. 
While harmonisation of laws was clearly the aim of the Directive, the court 
acknowledged that its material objective is to ensure that the data are available for the 
purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime and thus, 
ultimately, to contribute to public security. The court confirmed that the fight against 
international terrorism and serious crime constitutes an objective of general interest, 
pointing out that article 6 of the Charter includes the personal right to security.  
3.3 Was the Directive a proportionate measure? 
As is common in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the area of 
most dispute before the ECJ was the application of the proportionality principle, the 
interference and objective having been established. Notably, the court found that in 
                                               
11 Digital Rights Ireland, note 2 above, at [48]. 
12 (1983) BVerfGE 65, 1. 
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view of the important role played by the protection of personal data in the light of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life, and the extent and seriousness of the 
interference with that right caused by the Directive, the EU legislature's discretion is 
reduced, with the result that review of that discretion should be strict. 
The court accepted that the provisions included in the Directive were suitable to 
achieve the material objective. However, it ruled that while the fight against serious 
crime, in particular against organised crime and terrorism, is of the utmost 
importance, it "does not, in itself, justify a retention measure such as that established" 
in the Directive.
13
 Advocates for privacy will see this aspect of the decision, along 
with the ongoing fallout from the disclosures made by Edward Snowden, as evidence 
that the fight against terrorism and serious crime is no longer the universal trump card 
it once was. Communications service providers, and others that may find themselves 
obliged to disclose personal data to public bodies, are now in a much stronger position 
if they wish to oppose such disclosure requests. This is of both political and legal 
significance. 
In particular, the court criticised the adoption of a measure that: 
 Covers, in a generalised manner, all persons and all means of electronic 
communication, without any differentiation, limitation or exception being 
made in the light of its crime-fighting objective. 
 Affects, in a comprehensive manner, all persons using electronic 
communications services, but without the persons whose data are retained 
being, even indirectly, in a situation which is liable to give rise to criminal 
prosecutions.  
 Applies even to persons whose communications are subject to the obligation 
of professional secrecy. 
 Does not require any relationship between the data to be retained and a threat 
to public security and which, in particular, is not subject to a temporal or 
geographic restriction or a restriction to persons who could, for other reasons, 
contribute to the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious offences.  
As noted above, the Directive only harmonised certain aspects of the data retention 
system. The result was a mandatory EU framework governing the retention of 
communications data, with regulation of access to that data left to the member states. 
This led to significant discrepancies in the approaches employed by various members 
states with some, like the UK, authorising access to the data for purposes never 
envisaged in the Directive and to organisations unconcerned with the fight against 
crime and terrorism. In addition, the distinction between retention and access has 
allowed countries to adopt different procedural safeguards.  
The court has now made it clear that it would like to see a harmonised access regime 
with strictly applied substantive and procedural safeguards. The Directive was 
criticised for failing to lay down any objective criterion or substantive and procedural 
conditions governing competent national authorities' access to the data and their 
subsequent use for the purposes of law enforcement and public security. In particular, 
the court stated that it would like to see conditions on restricted access to and use of 
                                               
13 Digital Rights Ireland, note 2 above, at [51]. 
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data, a limitation to the number of persons authorised for such access or use, and prior 
review of access by an appropriate body. The lack of objective criteria for the 
duration of the retention period (between six and twenty-four months) was criticised, 
as was the absence of a distinction between different categories of data on the basis of 
their possible usefulness for the purposes of the objective pursued or according to the 
persons concerned.  
The court concluded that the Directive failed the proportionality test as it does not lay 
down clear any precise rules governing the extent of the interference with the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. Instead, it entails a 
wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those fundamental rights in 
the legal order of the EU, without such an interference being precisely circumscribed 
by provisions to ensure that it is actually limited to what is strictly necessary. 
Its criticism of the general manner in which the current Directive affected more or less 
the entire EU population with no regard for those citizens, whose actions would have 
never made them subject to any kind of criminal investigation is a clear indicator of 
the way in which the perception of the potential impact of surveillance on democratic 
structures has changed post-Snowden. In reminding the legislator that distinctions 
must be made and that future retention measures should ideally be limited temporally, 
geographically and by the type of data subject to whom they apply, the court has 
indicated that it would be much more comfortable with a targeted approach, even 
without reference to the contested terms “quick freeze” or data preservation”. 
3.4 Data security and transfer 
In addition to its consideration of the strict legal issues under review, the court also 
used its decision to raise the issue of data security. It highlighted the fact that the 
Directive does not provide for sufficient safeguards, nor does it impose a specific 
obligation on member states to establish such safeguards, to ensure the effective 
protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and against unlawful access 
and use. Specifically, the ECJ criticised how, through Article 7 in conjunction with 
Article 4(1), the Directive permits providers to have regard to economic 
considerations when determining the level of security which they apply. The Directive 
also fails to ensure the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the data 
retention period. The court was of the view that the Directive should include 
safeguards that are specific and adapted to the vast quantity of data to be retained, the 
sensitive nature of that data, and the risk of unlawful access to that data (e.g. rules on 
security and protection).  
More importantly, the court criticised that the Directive does not require the data in 
question to be retained within the EU. It argues that this makes it impossible to 
control compliance with applicable EU data protection and data security 
requirements. That control, which the court views as an essential component of the 
protection of individuals' data protection rights, must be exercised by an independent 
authority (Article 8(3), Charter). 
Stakeholders will surely have taken note of the ECJ’s comments on the need to store 
retained data within the EU to ensure independent oversight of compliance with 
applicable EU data protection and data security requirements by independent EU 
authorities in accordance with Article 8(3) of the Charter. It may very well be that this 
conclusion will prove to be a particularly explosive one, indicating as it does a 
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hardening of attitude with regard to international data flows. Following the Snowden 
allegations, it has become clear that many of the means used by EU governments and 
businesses to ensure that transfers of personal data to non-EU countries are lawful, do 
in practice enable transfers to countries like the US where those data may be accessed 
by public bodies on the basis of national laws that might not be compatible with the 
EU fundamental rights framework.  
The European Parliament and the European Commission are already discussing ways 
in which better control can be ensured in those situations. For example, discussions 
are ongoing between the Commission and the US government on how the EU-US safe 
harbour arrangement can be improved. The Parliament inserted additional restrictions 
that would tighten up data exports to non-EU countries into the draft General Data 
Protection Regulation. The ECJ’s observations with regard to the safeguards required 
in this area will also raise new questions with regard to other existing international 
arrangements, like the Agreements on the transfer of passenger names records and the 
financial transaction data, and inform the Commission’s position with regard to future 
negotiations of, for example, the long awaited EU-US data protection umbrella 
agreement. What is clear in the light of this judgement is that the status of privacy and 
data protection as fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order can no longer be 
ignored when those discussions are held. Otherwise there is always a risk that 
international agreement that may take years to negotiate will fall at the final hurdle of 
judicial review by the EU’s own court. 
It is as yet unclear what this may mean for EU data controllers who may wish to 
transfer personal data to providers outside the EU, for example in the context of cloud 
computing. While the fundamental rights framework does in the first instance provide 
a defence against state intrusions, it could be argued that it is now entirely possible 
that, for example, the ECJ would also find a provision in the proposed Data Protection 
Regulation incompatible with Charter rights, if the EU legislator fails to include 
adequate safeguards designed to protect EU citizens’ data from unauthorised access 
by third countries’ governments. The implications this decision may have for the 
ultimate shape of the new EU data protection framework is therefore difficult to 
assess at this stage. 
4. Implementation and impact of the decision 
Although the decision is silent on this matter, a press release published by the court 
makes it clear that in the light of the fact that the court has not imposed any temporal 
limitation on the invalidity, the Directive is invalid from the date it came into force.
14
 
This can be distinguished from the Advocate General’s advice to suspend such a 
declaration for a specified period,
15
 which is not discussed at all by the court. 
This means that there is currently no EU law mandating the retention of 
communications data. The European Commission has published an FAQ document, in 
which an optimistic tone is adopted, explaining that national legislation implementing 
the Directive will only have to be amended to the extent required by the court's 
                                               
14 “Press release 54/14” (8 Apr 2014) available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-04/cp140054en.pdf (accessed 14 Apr 14). 
15 Digital Rights Ireland (Opinion of the Advocate General) at [154-158]. 
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decision.
16
 It also highlights that member states' competence to adopt their own 
national data retention laws under Article 15(1) of the E-Privacy Directive remains 
unaffected. 
While the ECJ’s decision means that the Directive itself is invalid ab initio, the same 
does not necessarily apply to the national laws adopted by the member states to 
implement the Directive. This raises few difficulties for those countries directly 
involved in the current case, whose national courts are now tasked with applying the 
ECJ’s guidance to the legal challenge before them. For example, in Austria, where the 
referring Constitutional Court has the right to void an Act of Parliament, it is now 
likely that it will do so with regard to the Austrian implementing law. The High Court 
of Ireland has similarly robust powers. Similarly, in countries like Germany that have 
not yet re-implemented the Directive after the original national Act was declared null 
and void by its Constitutional Court under the national fundamental rights framework, 
are now free from the obligation to implement. In this context it is expected that the 
European Commission will withdraw the legal action already brought against 
Germany in this regard. 
However, the situation is somewhat more complicated in countries like the UK that 
have implemented the Directive and where communications service providers are 
consequently already retaining significant amounts of data on their customers. While 
it is generally assumed that national Parliaments will specifically have to repeal or 
revise national implementing laws (if courts do not do the job for them first, where 
constitutionally permitted), the right to adopt new measures is generally not contested 
provided that such measures comply with the requirements of the E-Privacy Directive. 
That directive permits “legislative measures providing for the retention of data for a 
limited period” (Article 15(1)), under certain circumstances. A measure that restricts 
the general obligation not to retain traffic data for longer than necessary for the 
providers own commercial purposes (Article 6(1) of the same Directive) must 
constitute a necessary, appropriate and proportionate measure within a democratic 
society to safeguard one of a list of public interest purposes. In practice, this is likely 
to mean that any national law that mandates the retention of communications data 
must now operate within the framework the ECJ set out in its current decision. 
Whether new data retention laws are now tackled at national or EU level is of limited 
legal relevance, although it is an interesting political question – not least because at 
least one member of the European Commission reacted very differently to the official 
line.
17
 
As far as the UK is concerned, an additional point is that of the UK’s approach to 
implementing EU legislation on the basis of section 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972 (ECA). Since the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 
2009 that implement the Directive were adopted as a statutory instrument, they 
constitute subordinate legislation that requires an enabling provision in order to be 
valid. Given that section 2(2) of the ECA only serves this function to the extent that it 
                                               
16 European Commission, “Frequently asked questions: the Data Retention Directive” (MEMO/14/269) 
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-269_en.htm (accessed 14 Apr 14).  
17 See Commissioner Viviane Reding’s post on Twitter (8 Apr 14): “#EU citizens+ #EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights win. Guaranteeing security+ respecting #dataProtection must go hand in hand. 
#dataRetention” available at https://twitter.com/VivianeRedingEU/status/453449768459833344 
(accessed 14 Apr 14). 
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authorises the implementation of an EU instrument, it may no longer be capable of 
doing so when that instrument, as in this case, is invalid from the date it came into 
force. If this were the case, it is therefore possible that the UK Regulations themselves 
are now without a legal basis and hence ultra vires the parent Act. If that were 
confirmed, the UK would have to adopt new provisions of primary legislation (a new 
Act or an amendment of an existing Act) if it wanted to re-introduce data retention 
requirements at national level. 
The rejection of the contention that retention affects the essence of the rights 
concerned does leave the door open for both the EU and the member states to adopt 
some kind of data retention framework in the future, provided that that framework 
takes on board the points raised by the court. Member states intending to rely on the 
Commission’s advice on the 2002 E-Privacy Directive must also be aware that the 
overall approach to data retention adopted by the ECJ on this occasion would be of 
the highest relevance if any future measures claiming to be authorised by the earlier 
Directive were to be challenged. Given the reliance on ECtHR decisions in the present 
case too, the prudent member state should hesitate before readopting provisions along 
the lines of the now invalid Directive. 
5. Conclusion 
It is difficult to overestimate the potential impact the ECJ’s decision is likely to have 
with regard not only to the retention of communications data but also the wider field 
of fundamental rights protection within the EU and the member states. To this extent, 
the court’s decision is truly capable of being a “game changer”, even if it has taken a 
long time for a decision that some commentators had doubted since it was proposed to 
be properly scrutinised. However, it is currently unclear how this will play out in 
detail and much of this will depend not only on the legal and cultural traditions of the 
individual members states but also on the political pressures their governments find 
themselves under. For EU citizens and businesses, in particular the communications 
service providers that were directly affected by the now invalid retention requirement, 
this is likely to mean a sustained period of legal uncertainty as the various institutions 
both at EU and at member state level come to an agreement on how this substantive 
and procedural issues raised by the ECJ’s decision should be resolved. At the same 
time, it could be argued that those substantive and procedural issues have always 
existed, at the very least since the EU Charter came into force, and that all that has 
happened is that the ECJ has now sharply removed the sticking plaster that up to now 
has held a creaking system together. It is to be hoped that discussions and decision-
making processes to deal with the long-term fallout of this decision will be made 
quickly to reduce any potential damage to EU citizens, businesses and the EU project 
as a whole. 
